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ABSTRACT
Previous work has had diﬃculty generating household saving behavior that makes the distribution of
wealth much more concentrated than that of labor earnings, and that makes the richest households
hold onto large amounts of wealth, even during very old age. I construct a quantitative, general
equilibrium, overlapping-generations model in which parents and children are linked by accidental
and voluntary bequests and by earnings ability. I show that voluntary bequests can explain the
emergence of large estates, while accidental bequests alone cannot, and that adding earnings persis-
tence within families increases wealth concentration even more. I also show that the introduction
of a bequest motive generates lifetime savings proﬁles more consistent with the data.
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System.1. Introduction
The goal of this paper is to study the forces behind households’ saving behavior that
make the distribution of wealth much more concentrated than that of labor earnings and that
push the richest households to hold onto large amounts of assets even during very old age.
Several papers have documented the fact that the distribution of wealth is much
more concentrated than that of labor earnings and that it is characterized by a tiny frac-
tion of households owning huge estates. (See, for example Hurst, Luoh, and Staﬀord (1998),
Wolﬀ (1987), Lillard and Willis (1978), Davies and Shorrocks (2000), D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, Quadrini,
and R´ ıos-Rull (1997).)
Among many possible reasons for wealth being much more concentrated than labor
earnings is that, not only are diﬀerent households at diﬀerent positions in their life cy-
cle (Huggett (1996)), but they also receive unequal intergenerational transfers (Hurd and
Smith (1999)). The aggregate ﬁgures for such transfers are large (Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1981),
Gale and Scholz (1994)). Transmission of human capital could also generate the emergence
of very large estates (Mulligan (1997)).
Many have studied the saving decisions of the elderly. Among these, Dynan, Skinner,
and Zeldes (1996) and Lillard and Karoly (1997) show that households with higher levels of
lifetime income have higher saving rates, keep substantial amounts of assets (even during old
age), and leave very large bequests. Carroll (1998) shows that neither standard life-cycle nor
dynastic models can recover the saving behavior of rich and poor families at the same time.
I focus on the life cycle and the transmission of physical capital and earnings ability
across generations and show that these forces can induce saving behavior that generates a
distribution of wealth that is much more concentrated than that of labor earnings and that
also makes the rich keep large amounts of assets in old age in order to leave bequests to
descendants.
I adopt a computable, general equilibrium, incomplete-markets, life-cycle model in
which parents and their children are linked by bequests, both voluntary and accidental,
and by the transmission of earnings ability. Here the households save to self-insure against
labor earnings shocks and life-span risk, for retirement, and possibly to leave bequests to
their children. I calibrate the model to match relevant features of the data and study itsimplications for wealth concentration and saving behavior.
I ﬁnd that voluntary bequests can explain the emergence of large estates, which are
often accumulated in more than one generation, and characterize the upper tail of the wealth
distribution in the data. Accidental bequests alone, even if unequally distributed, do not
generate more wealth concentration.
The presence of a bequest motive also generates lifetime saving proﬁles more consistent
with the data: saving for precautionary purposes and saving for retirement are the primary
factors for wealth accumulation at the lower tail of the distribution, while saving to leave
bequests signiﬁcantly aﬀects the shape of the upper tail.
Modeling bequests as a luxury good is key in matching both of these facts. The bequest
motive to save is thus stronger for the richest households, who, even when very old, keep some
assets to leave to their children. The rich leave more wealth to their oﬀspring, who, in turn,
tend to do the same. This behavior generates some large estates that are transmitted across
generations because of altruism, while being quantitatively consistent with the elasticity of
the savings of the elderly to permanent income that has been estimated from microeconomic
data (Altonji and Villanueva (2002)).
A human-capital link, through which children partially inherit the productivity of their
parents, generates an even more concentrated wealth distribution. More productive parents
accumulate larger estates and leave larger bequests to their children who, in turn, are more
productive than average in the workplace.
As a further test of the model, I also calibrate it to Swedish data. The cross-country
comparison between the United States and Sweden suggests that intergenerational links are
also important in economies where redistribution programs are more prominent and there
is less inequality. Even when I change only the smallest possible number of parameters to
match key Swedish data, the model with both intergenerational links does a better job of
reproducing wealth inequality in Sweden. This is particularly interesting because in Sweden
the very richest hold a smaller amount of total wealth than in the United States, while the
poorest hold even less wealth than in the United States. As a result, the Gini coeﬃcient of
Swedish wealth is close to that of the United States. As I argue later on, the behavior of the
poorest is well explained in the model by a more generous social insurance network in Sweden,
2while the bequest motive is quantitatively important in explaining the wealth accumulation
behavior of the richest even in Sweden.
A. Contributions with respect to the literature
The literature on inequality, bequests, and saving behavior is vast. Among the earlier
partial equilibrium studies, Davies (1982) analyzes the eﬀects of various factors, including
bequests, on economic inequality in a one-period model without uncertainty. In his setup
one generation of parents cares about their children’s future consumption, and there is re-
gression to the mean between parents’ and children’s earnings. As a consequence, the income
elasticity of bequests is high and inherited wealth is a major cause of wealth inequality. Like
Davies (1982), I adopt adopt a general equilibrium, overlapping-generations setup, with life-
time and earnings uncertainty, in which the expectation of receiving bequests from the parents
inﬂuences their children’s saving behavior. I also study the impact of various saving motives
over the life cycle and their eﬀects on accumulated wealth, and I model both accidental and
voluntary bequests and their impact on wealth inequality.
Laitner (1992) adopts a partial equilibrium model with two-sided altruism among
generations, constraints on net worth being nonnegative, and random lifetime earnings. He
shows that intergenerational transfers are a luxury good in this setup and that liquidity con-
straints are less binding for generations receiving larger transfers. He also discusses how this
economy can generate realistic capital-to-output ratios. He does not explore the implications
of his model for wealth inequality, and he abstracts from lifetime uncertainty and earnings
uncertainty over the life cycle.
Most of the general equilibrium, quantitative models of wealth inequality fall broadly
into two categories. The ﬁrst group of papers studies overlapping-generations economies
where all savings arise over the life cycle, while the second group studies economies with
inﬁnitely lived dynasties.
In the ﬁrst group of papers, Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) focus on the eﬀects
of social insurance programs on the wealth holdings of poor people. My paper, instead,
concentrates on the eﬀect of intergenerational links, especially on the upper tail of the wealth
distribution.
3Gokhale et al. (1998) quantify the amount of intra-generational wealth inequality
for the 66-year-old households arising from inheritances in a setup with random death and
fertility, assortative mating, and heterogeneous human capital. Families are assumed to have
a constant per capita consumption proﬁle (which results in a large aggregate ﬂow of accidental
bequests) and do not take into account expected bequests when making consumption and
saving decisions. In their model inheritances play an important role in generating intra-
generational wealth inequality because social security annuitizes the savings of poor and
middle-income people. In contrast with Gokhale et al. (1998), and consistent with the data,
my model generates higher saving rates for people with higher lifetime income and age-savings
proﬁles consistent with the empirical observations.
Huggett (1996) is interested in how much wealth inequality can be generated using a
pure life-cycle model with earnings shocks and an uncertain life span. His model matches
the U.S. Gini coeﬃcient for wealth, but the concentration is obtained by having more people
in the lower tail and a much thinner upper tail than observed in the actual wealth distribu-
tion. Compared to Huggett’s (1996) model, I add voluntary bequests and intergenerational
transmission of ability.
Heer (1999) adopts a life-cycle model in which rich and poor people have diﬀerent tastes
for leaving bequests. His characterization of the labor earnings process (people can be em-
ployed or unemployed) does not generate enough earnings inequality compared with the data,
and his model does not produce a large wealth concentration. Compared to Heer’s (1999)
model, my model does not rely on heterogeneous preferences and adopts a richer earnings
process, which matches earnings persistence (as measured in microeconomic data sets), and
also generates a reasonable distribution of labor earnings in the population. By including an
intergenerational transmission of earnings ability and comparing two very diﬀerent countries,
my paper also sheds light on the relative contribution of various factors in generating wealth
concentration.
As for the second group of papers, Krusell and Smith (1997) study an economy popu-
lated by inﬁnitely lived dynasties that face idiosyncratic income and preference shocks. They
show that it is possible to ﬁnd a stochastic process for the dynasties’ discount factor to match
the cross-sectional distribution of wealth. In contrast, I explicitly model the life-cycle struc-
4ture and intergenerational links, calibrate them to the data, and study the impact of each of
these forces.
Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, and R´ ıos-Rull (1998) study a model populated by dynastic
households that have some life-cycle ﬂavor: workers have a constant probability of retiring at
each period, retirees face a constant probability of dying, and each generation cares about its
own oﬀspring. Quadrini (2000) constructs an inﬁnitely lived agent model in which agents can
choose to be entrepreneurs. The simpliﬁed structures of these dynastic models do not allow
proper accounting for the life-cycle pattern of savings and the role of bequests in generating
wealth inequality.
In between the ﬁrst and second group of papers, recent work by Laitner (2001) mixes
life-cycle and dynastic behavior: all households save for life-cycle purposes, but only some
of them care about their own descendants. There are perfect annuity markets; therefore, all
bequests are voluntary. There is no earnings risk over the life cycle; hence, no precautionary
savings. The concentration in the upper tail of the wealth distribution is matched by choosing
the fraction of households that behave as a dynasty and also depends on the assumptions on
the distribution of wealth within the dynasty, which is indeterminate in the model.
My results are related to other studies that do not focus on the wealth distribution in
particular, but on saving choices more generally. Carroll (1998) concentrates on the fact that
in the data households with higher levels of lifetime income have higher lifetime saving rates.
He shows that neither standard life-cycle nor dynastic models can recover the saving behavior
of rich and poor families at the same time. To solve this puzzle he suggests a “capitalist spirit”
model, in which ﬁnitely lived consumers have wealth in the utility function. This model can
be calibrated to make wealth a luxury good, thus rendering nonhomothetic preferences. In my
model, nonhomotheticity arises because parents care about leaving bequests to their children.
This setup allows me to test whether the assumptions I make are consistent not only with
the saving behavior of single individuals but also with the wealth distribution as a whole.
Nishiyama (2000) uses macroeconomic data to measure parental altruism in a model
in which a parent and children interact strategically. The main focus of my paper is not to
measure parental altruism, but to assess the quantitative implications of intergenerational
transmission of bequests and earnings ability on wealth inequality.
5Hurd (1989) analyzes and estimates a life-cycle model with accidental and voluntary
bequests. His estimates of the marginal utility from leaving bequests, which is constant by
assumption, are small, and so are the implied desired bequests. These estimates are based on
a sample of single, retired people, most of whom are widowers and have low levels of assets,
and are thus consistent with the view that bequests are a luxury good.
2. Some Facts about the United States and Sweden
Including residential structures, plant and equipment, land, and consumer durables in
my measure of capital, I obtain an average capital-to-GDP ratio of about 3 for the United
States during the 1959–92 period1 (Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1995)) and about 2 for Sweden
(Hansson (1989)).
Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1981) estimate that private transfers of wealth across gener-
ations account for at least 80% of the current value of total wealth. A recent study by Gale
and Scholz (1994) estimates this number to be 60%, including bequests and inter vivos trans-
fers (adjusted for underreporting), but not college payments. The ratio of inheritances to
wealth for Sweden comes from Laitner and Ohlsson (1997), who compute the current value of
household inheritances in Sweden as a fraction of household wealth. The Swedish data seem
to be of lower quality than the U.S. data and do not include inter vivos transfers. Hence, the
numbers for Sweden are likely to be lower bounds for the actual numbers.
Capital Transfer Percentage wealth in the top
GDP wealth Wealth ——————————————–
ratio ratio Gini 1% 5% 20% 40% 60% 80%
U.S. data
3.0 .60 .78 29 53 80 93 98 100
Swedish data
2.0 >. 51 .73 17 37 75 99 100 100
Table 1: Wealth.
The U.S. data on the wealth distribution are from the 1989 Survey of Finances (SCF)
and refer to households 25 years of age and older. The distribution for 1992 is very similar.
1The wealth-to-GDP ratio for the United States is remarkably close to the capital-to-GDP ratio, varying
between 2.9 in 1989 and 3.1 in 1991.
6Wealth includes owner-occupied housing, other real estate, cash, ﬁnancial securities, unincor-
porated business equity, insurance, and pension cash surrender value, and is net of mortgages
and other debt. For Sweden, the wealth distribution data refer to 1984–85 (Palsson (1993)).
Percentage earnings in the top
Gini
coeﬀ. 1% 5% 20% 40% 80%
U.S. data
.46 6 19 48 72 98
Swedish data
.40 4 15 42 68 98
Table 2: Gross earnings.
Table 2 is computed using data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data set,
which collects income data sets from various countries (based on the March Current Popula-
tion Survey for the United States) and makes them comparable. The table is computed using
data for households whose head is 25 to 60 years of age, and the deﬁnition of gross earnings
includes wages, salaries, and self-employment income. Tables 1 and 2 show that earnings
display a much lower concentration than wealth.
Comparing earnings and wealth inequality across these two countries, we can see that
the Swedish earnings distribution is less concentrated than the U.S. distribution, but the Gini
coeﬃcient for wealth is close in the two countries (.78 in the United States and .73 in Sweden).
The high Gini coeﬃcients for wealth result from diﬀerent reasons. In the United States the
richest 1–5% of people hold a large fraction of total wealth, 29%, and the poorest 60% of
the population hold 7% of total net worth. On the contrary, in Sweden the richest 1–5% of
people do not hold as much of total wealth, 17%, but the poorest 60% of people hold only
1% of total net worth. This may be due to the fact that social security and unemployment
beneﬁts are more generous in Sweden than in the United States, and these social insurance
programs are a disincentive to save, especially for people with low lifetime earnings. In fact,
people for whom social security beneﬁts are high compared to their lifetime income will not
save for retirement in the presence of a redistributive social security system. Moreover, if
security nets (such as unemployment insurance) are substantial, precautionary savings will
7be lower.
3. The Model
The economy is populated by an inﬁnitely lived government and overlapping gener-
ations of people, who may diﬀer in their productivity levels. The members of successive
generations are linked by bequests and the children’s inheritance of part of their parent’s
productivity. At age 20 each person enters the model and starts consuming, working, and
paying labor and capital income taxes. At age 25 the consumer procreates. After retirement
the agent no longer works but receives social security beneﬁts from the government and in-
terest from accumulated assets. The government taxes labor earnings, capital income, and
estates and pays pensions to the retirees.
A. Demographics
During each model period, which is ﬁve years long, a continuum of people2 is born.
I deﬁne age t = 1 as 20 years old, age t = 2 as 25 years old, and so on. After one model
period, at t = 2, the agent’s children are born, and four periods later (when the agent is 45
years old) the children are 20 and start working. Since there are no inter vivos transfers in
this model economy, all agents start oﬀ their working life with no wealth. Total population
grows at a constant, exogenous rate (n), and each agent has the same number of children.3
The agents retire at t = tr = 9 (i.e., when they are 65 years old) and die for sure by the end
of age T = 14 (i.e., before turning 90 years old). From t = tr − 1 (i.e., 60 years of age) to T,
each person faces a positive probability of dying given by (1 − αt). Since death is assumed
to be certain after age T, αT = 0. The assumption that people do not die before 60 years
of age reduces computational time and does not inﬂuence the results because the number of
people dying between the ages of 20 and 60 is small.
Since I consider only stationary environments, the variables are indexed only by age,
t, and the index for time is left implicit.
2In the theoretical sections, I use the terms “agent,” “person,” “consumer,” and “household” interchange-
ably. Each household is taken to be composed of one person and dependent children.
3The number of children is thus n5 if n is the growth rate of the population over ﬁve years, or n25 if n is
expressed in yearly terms.
8B. Preferences and Technology
Preferences are assumed to be time separable, with a constant discount factor. The
utility from consumption in each period is given by u(ct)=c
1−σ
t /(1 − σ).
Parents care about their selﬁsh children. The particular form of altruism I consider
is called warm glow: the parents derive utility from leaving a bequest (net of estate taxes)
to their children. The utility from leaving a net bequest, bt,i sφ(bt). Considering a more
sophisticated form of altruism would increase the number of state variables (already four in
this setup) and, in some cases, would generate strategic parent-child interaction.
In this economy all agents face the same exogenous age-eﬃciency proﬁle,  t, during
their working years. This proﬁle is estimated from the data and recovers the fact that produc-
tive ability changes over the life cycle. Workers also face stochastic shocks to their produc-
tivity level. These shocks are represented by a Markov process {yt} deﬁned on (Y,B(Y )) and
characterized by a transition function Qy,w h e r eY ⊂  ++ and B(Y )i st h eB o r e lσ-algebra
on Y . This Markov process is the same for all households. The total productivity of a worker
of age t is given by the product of the worker’s stochastic productivity in that period and
the worker’s deterministic eﬃciency index at the same age: yt t. The parent’s productivity
shock at age 40 is transmitted to children at age 20 according to a transition function Qyh,
deﬁned on (Y,B(Y )). What the children inherit is only their ﬁrst draw; from age 20 on, their
productivity yt evolves stochastically according to Qy.
I assume that children cannot observe directly their parent’s assets, but only their
parent’s productivity when the parent is 40 and the children are 15, that is, the period before
they “leave home” and start working. Based on this information, children infer the size of
the bequest they are likely to receive. I will discuss the relevance and the qualitative eﬀects
of relaxing all of these assumptions in Section 7.
The household can only invest in physical capital, at a rate of return r. The depreci-
ation rate is δ, so the gross-of-depreciation rate of return on capital is r + δ. I assume also
that the agents face borrowing constraints that do not allow them to hold negative assets at
any time.
I assume that the United States is a closed economy with an aggregate production
function F(K,L)=AKαL1−α,w h e r eK is aggregate capital and L is aggregate labor. I
9instead assume that Sweden is a small open economy, so the interest rate net of taxes is
taken as exogenous and equal to that of the United States. For each country, I normalize the
units of labor and of the good so that, in the steady state, the average labor earnings of a
worker per period and the wage are both one.
C. Government
The government taxes labor earnings, capital income, and estates to ﬁnance the ex-
ogenous public expenditure and to provide pensions to the retired agents.
Labor earnings are taken as exogenous and calibrated to the data, matching the after-
tax Gini coeﬃcient. Since the U.S. tax system is progressive, this Gini coeﬃcient is lower
than the one computed from pre-tax labor earnings. In the model, I introduce a constant tax
rate τl in order to balance the government budget, while all the progressive features of the
tax system are already reﬂected in the calibrated after-tax earnings distribution.
Income from capital is taxed at a ﬂat rate τa. Estates larger than a given value exb
are taxed at rate τb on the amount in excess of exb.
The structure of the social security system is the following: the retired agents receive
a lump-sum transfer from the government each period until they die. The amount of this
transfer is linked to the average earnings of a person in the economy.
D. The Household’s Recursive Problem
I consider an environment in which, during each period, a t-year-old agent chooses
consumption c and risk-free asset holdings for the next period, a . For given prices, the state
variables for an agent are denoted by x =( t,a,y,yp). These variables indicate, respectively,
the agent’s age (t), the agent’s assets carried from the previous period (a), the agent’s current
productivity process realization (y), and the value of the agent’s parent’s productivity at age
40 until the agent inherits and zero thereafter (yp). This last variable takes on two purposes.
First, when it is positive, it is used to compute the probability distribution on bequests that
the household expects from the parent. Second, it distinguishes the agents who have already
inherited, for whom I set yp = 0, from those who have not, for whom yp is strictly positive.
The agents inherit bequests only once in a lifetime, at a random date which depends on their
parent’s death. Since there is no market for annuities, part of the bequests the child receives
10are accidental bequests, linked to the fact that people’s life span is uncertain and people
therefore accumulate precautionary savings to oﬀset the life-span risk. The optimal decision
rules are functions for consumption, c(x), and next period’s asset holdings, a (x), that solve
the dynamic programming problem described below.
(i) From age t = 1 to age t = 3 (from 20 to 30 years of age), the agent works and will
survive with certainty until next period. Moreover, the agent does not expect to receive
a bequest soon because his or her parent is younger than 60 and will survive at least one
more period for sure. Since the law of motion of yp is dictated by the death probability
of the parent, for this subperiod yp  = yp.T h u s ,
(1) V (t,a,y,yp)=m a x
c,a
 















a − c +( 1− τl) t y.
The interest rate on assets is denoted by r, and the evolution of y  is described by the
transition function Qy.
(ii) From t =4t ot = 8 (from 35 to 55 years of age), the worker will survive for sure up to
the next period. However, the agent’s parent is at least 60 years old and faces a positive
probability of dying any period; hence, a bequest might be received at the beginning of
the next period. Let Iyp>0 be the indicator function for yp > 0; it is one if yp > 0a n d
zero otherwise. Thus,
(4) V (t,a,y,yp)=m a x
c,a
 











a − c +( 1− τl) t y + b






yp with probability αt+5
0 with probability (1 − αt+5)
where Et is the conditional expectation based on the information available at time t.
The conditional distribution of the bequest a person expects in case of parental death
is denoted by µb(x;.).4 In equilibrium this distribution must be consistent with the
parent’s behavior. Since the evolution of the state variable yp is dictated by the death
process of the parent, yp  jumps to zero with probability αt+5. (Five periods is the
diﬀerence in age between parents and their children.) I assume the following processes
to be independent: the survival/death of the decision maker; the survival/death of
the parent; the size of the bequest received from the parent, conditional on the parent
dying; and the future labor earnings, conditional on the current earnings.
(iii) The subperiod tr − 1 (60 years old) is the period before retirement. The agent starts
facing a positive probability of dying, in which case the agent derives utility from
bequeathing his or her assets. Deﬁne after-tax bequests as b(a )=a −τb·max(0,a  −exb).
Thus,














subject to (2), (5), and (6). The term φ1 reﬂects the parent’s altruism toward the
children, while φ2 measures the extent to which bequests are a luxury good.5
(iv) From tr to T (from 65 to 85), is the period after retirement. The agent does not inherit
after turning 65 because the agent’s parent is already dead at that time. Moreover, I
assume that people no longer work after retirement and live oﬀ pensions and interest.
4The probability distribution µb depends on x only through t and yp, not through y.
5Even with full altruism, preferences over bequests and consumption would not be homothetic. This is
because bequests add to the permanent income of the children, which is already positive.
12This implies that I can drop two state variables from the retired people’s value function,
y and yp, and that the only uncertainty the retired agents face is the time of their death:




 )+( 1− αt)φ(b(a
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a − c + p
where p is the pension payment from the government. The terminal period value
function W(T +1 ,a) is set to equal φ(b(a)).
E. Deﬁnition of Stationary Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium is given by

         
         
an interest rate r and wage rate w,
allocations c(x),a  (x),
government tax rates and transfers (τa,τ l,τ b,ex b,p),
a family of probability distributions for bequests µb(x;·),
and a constant distribution of people over the state variables x: m∗(x)
such that the following hold:
(i) Given the interest rate, the wage, government tax rates and transfers, and the expected
bequest distribution µb(x;·), the functions c(x)a n da (x) solve the above described
maximization problem for a household with state variables x.
(ii) The tax rate τl is chosen so that the government budget constraint balances at every
13period:
g =
   
τa ra+ τl t yIt<tr − pI t≥tr
+ τb(1 − αt−1) · max(0,a




(iii) The invariant distribution of households over the state variables for this economy, m∗,
is a ﬁxed point of the operator RM deﬁned in Appendix A1: RMm∗ = m∗. I normalize
m∗ so that m∗(X) = 1, which implies that m∗(χ) is the fraction of people alive that are
in a state χ ∈X.
(iv) The United States is treated as a closed economy. Aggregate capital K is given by
 
adm ∗(x). Aggregate eﬀective labor is denoted by L. The wage w is normalized to
be one at the steady state. Given that I assume a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production
function, for given equilibrium r, I require that the share of income going to capital is
α,t h a ti s ,
(r+δ)K
(r+δ)K+wL = α, where α is determined by the calibration.
Sweden is treated as a small open economy, so r is taken as exogenous. The wage is
normalized to one, and K is given by
 
adm ∗(x). In this case, K represents the average
wealth held by Swedish citizens (in Sweden and abroad), which may diﬀer from average
capital present in Sweden (held by Swedish people and foreigners).
(v) The family of expected bequest distributions µb(x;·) is consistent with the bequests
that are actually left by the parents. See Appendix A2 for a formal characterization of
this statement.
4. The Experiments
To understand the quantitative importance of these intergenerational links, I construct
several simulations. I start with an experiment in which the model is stripped of all inter-
generational links: an overlapping-generations model with life-span and earnings uncertainty.
The accidental bequests left by the people who die prematurely are seized by the government
14and equally redistributed to all people alive.6 The idea is to see how much wealth inequality
can be generated by the life-cycle structure when only life-span and earnings uncertainty are
activated. In the second experiment unplanned bequests are distributed to the children of
the deceased, rather than equally to everybody alive. This is meant to assess whether an
unequal distribution of estates is quantitatively important when all bequests are involuntary.
The third experiment adds inheritance of ability to the second one. In the fourth experiment
parents care about leaving bequests to their children, but there is no inheritance of ability.
The ﬁfth exercise activates both the bequest motive and the parent’s productivity inheritance
in order to evaluate the importance of both intergenerational links jointly.
To be consistent across experiments, I use the same initial distribution of productivity
for 20-year-old workers in all simulations for a given country. To do so, for each country
I compute the initial aggregate distribution of productivity implied by the experiment with
inheritance of productivity and use it to initialize all the 20-year-old workers in the simulations
without productivity inheritance.
5. Calibration
I distinguish two sets of parameters: those that can be estimated independently of
the model or are based on estimates provided by other studies (Table 3), and those that I
choose so that the model-generated data match a given set of targets (Table 4). Appendix
A3 provides more details about the calibration.
Table 3. The αt’s are the vectors of conditional survival probabilities for people older
than 60,  t is the age-eﬃciency proﬁle vector, n is the rate of population growth, g is govern-
ment expenditures, and τa is the capital income tax.
The logarithm of the productivity process is assumed to be an AR(1) with persistence
ρy and variance σ2
y. For the United States these two parameters are estimated from Panel
Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) data, aggregated over ﬁve years in order to be consistent
with the model period.7
6This exercise uses Huggett’s setup but adapts it to the length of the periods and the productivity process
that I use throughout this paper in order to make the results comparable to the other simulations I run. I
cannot use the same time period and income process that Huggett uses, since the simulations with altruism
require a higher number of state variables and the model would require huge computing resources to solve.
7I am very grateful to Joe Altonji and Ernesto Villanueva for kindly providing me with these estimates.
15Parameter U.S. calibration Swedish calibration
αt vector vector
 t vector vector
n 1.2% yearly 0.8% yearly









Table 3: Parameters estimated independently of the model or provided by other studies.
The logarithm of the productivity inheritance process (for yp)i sa l s oa s s u m e dt ob ea n
AR(1) with persistence ρyh and variance σ2
yh.It a k eρyh from Zimmerman (1992), and for the
United States I choose σ2
yh to match a Gini coeﬃcient of .44 for earnings. These assumptions
generate an increase in earnings inequality over the life cycle that is consistent with the data.
The persistence of the productivity and productivity inheritance processes are taken
to be the same for Sweden and the United States. Bj¨ orklund and J¨ antti (1997) estimate
the degree of intergenerational income mobility in Sweden and do not reject the hypothesis
that it is the same as in the United States. As for the variances, in Sweden more generous
social insurance programs partially insure households from idiosyncratic shocks and decrease
earnings inequality. (More so than in the United States; see De Nardi, Ren, and Wei (2000).)
To recover this eﬀect, I reduce both σy and σyh for Sweden to match a Gini coeﬃcient for
earnings of .33, while imposing that the ratio of σy and σyh for Sweden to be equal to the
corresponding ratio for the United States.
I take risk aversion, σ, to be the same in the United States and in Sweden. The value
that I use in the calibration is from Attanasio et al. (1999) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002),
who estimate it using consumption data. This value falls in the range (1–3) commonly used
in the literature.
Table 4. The remaining parameters are chosen to match features of the respective
economies as follows. The rate r is the interest rate on capital, net of depreciation and
16Calibrated
Parameter U.S. calibration Swedish calibration
r 6% 6.86%
p 40% average earnings 47–50% average earnings
τb 10% 15%




Table 4: Parameters used to match some features in the data.
gross of taxes. For the United States, I ﬁx it at 6%, so that the corresponding capital share
of output turns out to be .36 across the various simulations. This choice is motivated by
long-run observations on capital shares in the U.S economy (Cooley and Prescott (1995)).
Given that I assume that Sweden is a small open economy, I take its interest rate to
be 6.86% so that the interest rates net of taxes in the two countries coincide.
Pensions, p: for each country, the social security replacement rates are chosen such
that the ratios of government transfers to GDP generated by the model are consistent with
the ratio reported in the Economic Report of the President (1998) for the United States and
with the one (net of taxes) reported in OECD Economic Surveys, 1998-1999: Sweden (1999)
for 1996 (respectively, 7% and 12%). The implied replacement rate for the United States
is 40%, across all experiments, which is a number similar to those used in many papers on
social security. The implied replacement rate for Sweden is 50% in the experiments without
a bequest motive, and 47% in the other two. Using the same replacement rate of 50% in
all simulations for Sweden would generate very similar wealth distributions and a marginally
lower capital-output ratio.
The rate τb is the tax rate on estates that exceed the exemption level exb.F o r t h e
United States I set these parameters to match the observed ratio of estate tax revenues to
GDP, and the proportion of estates that pay estate taxes, 1.5% in the experiment with both
intergenerational links.
In Sweden taxes are paid on inheritances, rather than on estates. It is therefore more
diﬃcult than in the United States to deﬁne the statutory exemption level. The combined
17choice of τb and exb matches the revenues from bequests and gift taxes as a fraction of GDP in
the experiment with both intergenerational links. I do sensitivity analysis on these parameters
for Sweden and ﬁnd that the results do not vary signiﬁcantly for reasonable values of these
parameters.
For the United States, in each experiment I choose the discount factor, β,t om a t c h
a capital-to-GDP ratio of 3. On a yearly basis, β turns out to be .97 in the simulation in
which accidental bequests are equally distributed, .96 in the two experiments with accidental
bequests (one with and one without productivity inheritance), and .95 in the two simulations
with bequest motives, with and without productivity inheritance.
Iu s eφ1 to match a transfer wealth share of 60% in the U.S. simulation with both
intergenerational links.
Many people leave estates of little or no value: according to Hurd and Smith (1999), the
average bequest left by single decedents at the lowest 30th percentile was $2,000 (Asset and
Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data set, 1993–95). Median household
income in 1994 was $32,264 (U.S. Census Web site, CPS data). I choose φ2 to match that
ratio in the model with both links. Using the average bequest left by singles rather than
the one for all decedents (which turns out to be $10,000) is a more sensible choice because
typically a surviving spouse inherits a share of the estate, which will be partly consumed
before ﬁnally being left to the couple’s children.
I choose to use the same parameter values for φ1 and φ2 , τb and exb, in the simulations
with bequest motive only or with both intergenerational links in order to disentangle the
increase in wealth inequality due to the two links when the preference parameters for bequests
and estate taxation are the same.
The preference parameters for Sweden are assumed to be equal to those for the United
States.
6. Results
Tables 5 and 6 summarize the results for the United States and Sweden.8
8For all experiments I exclude 20-year-old people from the computations on the wealth distribution because
I assume that people start oﬀ with zero wealth, and hence I do not propose a theory of the distribution of
wealth for them. To explain the data for 20-year-old people, a theory of inter vivos transfers would, in my
18Transfer Percentage wealth in the top Percentage with
wealth Wealth negative or
ratio Gini 1% 5% 20% 40% 60% zero wealth
U.S. data
.60 .78 29 53 80 93 98 5.8–15.0
No intergenerational links, equal bequests to all
.67 .67 7 27 69 90 98 17
No intergenerational links, unequal bequests to children
.38 .68 7 27 69 91 99 17
One link: productivity inheritance
.38 .69 8 29 70 92 99 17
One link: parent’s bequest motive
.55 .74 14 37 76 95 100 19
Both links: parent’s bequest motive and productivity inheritance
.60 .76 18 42 79 95 100 19
Table 5: Results for the U.S. calibration.
A. No Intergenerational Links
Line 2 in Table 5 shows that an overlapping-generations model with no dynastic links
and equal distribution of bequests has serious diﬃculties in generating enough skewness to
match the U.S. distribution of wealth. The lower tail of the wealth distribution is too fat,
and its upper tail is far too thin.
The large number of people at low asset levels is a common problem of overlapping-
generations models. The households are born without savings that could be used to absorb
negative productivity shocks; hence, all young consumers who get a bad productivity shock
hit the borrowing constraint. As households work and get older, they gradually accumulate
assets for self-insurance purposes and to ﬁnance consumption during retirement and the
fraction of people with low wealth gradually declines until retirement.
As for the upper tail, the richest 1% and 5% of people in the model hold, respectively,
only 7% and 27% of total assets, compared with 29% and 53% in the data. The households
save to buﬀer against income shocks, for retirement, and to self-insure against the risk of
having a long life span. These saving motives are not suﬃcient to generate huge asset holdings
opinion, be required. The 20-year-olds are also excluded from the U.S. data on the distribution.
19Wealth Transfer Percentage wealth in the top Percentage with
GDP wealth Wealth negative or
ratio ratio Gini 1% 5% 20% 40% 60% zero wealth
Swedish data
2.0 >. 51 .73 17 37 75 99 100 30
No intergenerational links, equal bequests to all
2.0 .73 .67 7 26 68 90 98 22
No intergenerational links, unequal bequests to children
1.9 .42 .69 7 28 71 93 99 26
One link: productivity inheritance
1.9 .43 .70 8 30 72 93 100 28
One link: bequest motive
1.5 .46 .74 9 32 76 96 100 33
Both links: bequest motive and productivity inheritance
1.5 .47 .75 10 34 78 96 100 33
Table 6: Results for the Swedish calibration.
for parameterizations of the relevant processes that are consistent with the data.


















Figure 1: U.S. wealth .1, .3, .5, .7, .9, .95 quantiles, by age. No links, equal bequests to all.
The overlapping-generations model with no intergenerational links also fails to recover
the age-asset proﬁle observed in the data. All households in the model economy (Figure 1)
run down their assets during retirement until they are left with zero wealth at the time we
assume they die for sure. This implies a much larger dissaving than observed in the data,
especially for the richer households. Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (1996) ﬁnd that the richest
20retirees (deﬁned as those in the richest quintile or in the top 5% or 1% of the lifetime income
distribution) not only keep substantial amounts of assets at advanced ages, but also keep
saving a larger fraction of their income than the poorest retirees. Based on their empirical
ﬁndings, the authors argue, “The results clearly rule out models that imply that saving is
proportional to permanent income.” They argue further that “These results suggest that in
the top 1% (or top 5%) of the population the motives for saving, in particular for bequests,
might be diﬀerent from their less aﬄuent (but still high income) colleagues.”
The transfer-wealth ratio appears high for this simulation because all living agents
receive a transfer every year, starting at age 20 (rather than at age 54 on average, as it
happens with more realistic timing of bequests), and this measure includes interest from
received transfers. This bias becomes clearer in line 3, which corresponds to the model
economy in which accidental bequests are distributed to the children of those who die. In
this case, the measure declines from .67 to .38, even though the aggregate amount of bequests
left in every period is almost the same.
Compared to the U.S. calibration, the households in the Swedish model economy face
less earnings uncertainty and a higher social security replacement rate. The ﬁrst element
reduces precautionary saving, and the second one reduces life-cycle saving. Given that I
assume Swedish people to be as patient as those in the United States, the model predicts
a lower wealth-to-GDP ratio than in the United States. The distribution of wealth shows
that, even in Sweden, the basic version of the model generates an upper tail of the wealth
distribution which is too thin; the richest 1% of people hold only 7% of total wealth, compared
with 14% in the data. Unlike the results for the U.S. model economy, the model for Sweden
does not generate too many people at zero wealth.
Line 3 in Tables 5 and 6 displays the experiment in which accidental bequests are
inherited by the children of the deceased, rather than being distributed equally to all living
people. Comparing lines 2 and 3, we can see that distributing accidental bequests unequally,
rather than equally, does not signiﬁcantly increase wealth concentration in either country.
The intuition is the following: some people in the economy inherit some wealth, other people
do not, but nobody cares about leaving bequests. Without a bequest motive, even high-
income households dissave quickly after retirement. The age-asset proﬁles for the various
21quantiles of the wealth distribution almost coincide with those generated by the previous
experiment. In this economy, the large bequests are the ones left by 65-year-old people who
die prematurely. Older people, even if they were rich at age 65, keep few assets and leave
small or no bequests when they die at advanced ages. The likelihood that several generations
of the same family die around age 65 is very small. For this reason this model fails to generate
the intergenerational transmission of large estates observed in the data.
B. With Intergenerational Links
Line 4 in Tables 5 and 6 shows that introducing productivity inheritance in the model
with accidental bequests has small eﬀects on wealth inequality. The fraction of total wealth
held by the richest 1% of people increases from 7% to 8% in both countries. More productive
parents tend to have more productive children, who, on average, receive larger bequests.
However, this eﬀect is small because just inheriting a higher productivity level from their
parents does not make people choose higher saving rates, which is the mechanism that leads
to the accumulation of the large fortunes observed in the data.
Even if the parameters in the bequest function were not chosen to generate more
wealth concentration, we can see from line 5 in Tables 5 and 6 that the introduction of the
bequest motive leads to a large increase in the concentration of wealth. In the simulations
for the United States, the fraction of total wealth held by the people in the upper tail of
the distribution increases signiﬁcantly. The richest 1% of the population holds 14% of total
wealth, and the richest 5% holds 37% of total wealth. In the simulations for Sweden, including
the bequest motive increases the share of wealth held by the richest 1% of people from 7%
to 9% and increases the share held by the top 5% from 26% to 32%.
The intuition for why this happens is that the introduction of a nonhomothetic bequest
motive makes bequests a luxury good. Households that either have high lifetime income or
receive large bequests, or both, choose a higher saving rate, build up large estates, and keep
a signiﬁcant amount of assets even at advanced ages. These households, therefore, are more
likely to leave large bequests when they die. This mechanism explains the emergence of the
large estates that are accumulated by more than one generation of savers and are transmitted
because of altruism.















Figure 2: U.S. wealth .1, .3, .5, .7, .9, .95 quantiles, by age. Experiment with bequest motive
only.
The age-asset proﬁles for various quantiles of the U.S. wealth distribution are displayed
in Figure 2. In this ﬁgure notice a substantial diﬀerence in the main motives that lead the
households to save. The median household saves mostly for retirement: the peak in its wealth
holdings occurs at age 65, and if the household reaches the age of 85, it consumes all of its
assets (before dying at age 90) and does not leave any bequest. The median consumer leaves
mostly unintended bequests. This becomes clearer when we compare the age-asset proﬁles
for the poorest 10%, 30%, and 50% with the model with no bequest motive (Figure 1): the
proﬁles are very close.
At the top of the wealth distribution, a signiﬁcant part of wealth is accumulated in
order to leave bequests, and large bequests are left even when the parents die in advanced
age. Comparing these top quantiles with those in the model with no altruistic links, we see
how the introduction of a bequest motive produces an age-wealth proﬁle for the retirees that
is consistent with Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes’ (1996) ﬁndings. This is another feature of the
model that is not matched by construction, but should be seen as a test of the model and its
calibration.
Line 6 in Tables 5 and 6 refers to the experiment in which both intergenerational links
are activated. This version of the model does an even better job of matching the observed
skewness in asset holdings. In the simulations for the United States, the richest 1% of the
population holds 18% of total wealth, up from 14% in the previous simulation, and the
23richest 5% holds 42% of total wealth, up from 37%. The intergenerational transmission of
productivity helps further in matching the top 20% of the wealth distribution for Sweden:
the shares held by the richest 1%, 5%, and 10% increase to 10%, 32%, and 52%, respectively.
When both intergenerational links are present, parents and children are linked not only
by the bequest the parent intends to leave to the children, but also through transmission
of productivity. Success in the workforce is now correlated across generations, and more
productive parents accumulate larger estates and leave their bequests to their children who
are, in turn, more productive than average in the workforce.






















Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of estates, solid=model, dash-dot=AHEAD data.
To further gauge the ability of the model to explain the households’ saving decisions,
it is useful to compare other implications of the model to the data. I now look at the estate
distribution and the elasticity of bequests to permanent income.
Figure 3 displays the cumulative distribution of estates implied by the model and the
distribution that Hurd and Smith (1999) report from the AHEAD data for single decedents.
The size of the estates is normalized by median household income. One parameter of the
model was chosen so that the two distributions match at one point: the 30th percentile. The
estate distribution generated by the model actually compares very well to the AHEAD data
until the 70th percentile of the estate distribution. From that point on, the model predicts
larger bequests than those observed in the AHEAD data. The discrepancy is partly due to
the fact that AHEAD misses some large estates. As Davies and Shorrocks (2000) point out,
24over-sampling the rich is necessary to obtain a good representation of the asset holdings of
the richest.
The model’s implications about the elasticity of the old people’s savings to permanent
income are consistent with recent microeconomic estimates. Altonji and Villanueva (2002)
use U.S. data from the PSID to estimate the eﬀect of an increase of one dollar of permanent
income on the asset holdings of the 70-year-old people. They ﬁnd that this eﬀect is rather
small. To check whether this can be consistent with a model with voluntary bequests such as
mine, they run the same regressions on the actual data and on data simulated using the models
in this paper for the United States. They ﬁnd that the eﬀect of a dollar of permanent income
on the old people’s savings generated by my model with voluntary bequests is consistent with
the magnitudes that they estimate in the data.
























Figure 4: U.S. calibration. Strictly posi-
tive range of the expected bequest distri-
bution at age 40, conditional on the pro-
ductivity of the parent.
























Figure 5: Swedish calibration. Strictly
positive range of the expected bequest dis-
tribution at age 40, conditional on the
productivity of the parent.
Now look at some of the features generated by the model to better understand its
functioning. Figure 4 displays the strictly positive range of the bequest distribution for a
40-year-old person, conditional on the person’s parent’s observed productivity level, should
the parent die during that period. At that age, the probabilities of receiving zero bequests
are, respectively, 54%, 27%, 4%, and 0%, for people with parents in the lowest, second
lowest, second highest, and highest productivity levels. The average bequests expected are,
respectively, 3, 5, 10, and 21 years of average labor earnings. Even in the presence of a
25bequest motive, the parents run down their assets after retirement, so the expected bequest
declines. The fraction of people whose parent lives up to the ﬁnal age of the model economy
and who do not receive a positive bequest are 97%, 95%, 90%, and 56%, respectively. The
average bequest that they expect at that point in life is about 1.4, 1.7, 2.6, and 6.6 years of
average labor earnings.
Figure 5 shows the strictly positive range of the bequest distribution for 40-year-old
Swedish agents, should their parent die this period. For people whose parent was at the
lowest productivity level at age 40, the average bequest is 0.6 years of average labor earnings,
and the probability of receiving no intergenerational transfer is 65%. For those whose parent
was at the highest productivity level at age 40, the average bequest is 9 years of average labor
earnings, and the probability of receiving no intergenerational transfer is 0%. Compared to
the U.S. simulation, the average bequest size for all parents’ levels of ability is lower.










Figure 6: U.S. calibration. Saving rate for households who expect to inherit or not. Experi-
ment with bequest motive only.
Figure 6 compares the saving behavior of the average U.S. agent who expects to receive
some bequest with the agent’s behavior in the hypothetical case in which the agent does not
expect to receive a bequest. The fact that a parent’s assets are not observable inﬂuences
the saving behavior of people who have not yet inherited. Since in this economy children do
not become orphans before age 40 and everybody attributes positive probability to receiving
some bequest until their parent dies, the comparison starts for agents of age 40. For them,
we can compare the behavior of people whose parent died and did not leave them any asset
26(these children do not expect an inheritance anymore) with the behavior of people who still
expect to receive something. The top line refers to the age-saving proﬁle for the average
agent in the case in which the agent does not expect to inherit. While the average expected
bequest decreases over time, because of parental asset decumulation, the probability of the
parent’s death increases over time. These two forces balance out, decreasing the saving rate
by similar amounts over the life cycle. The corresponding ﬁgure for Sweden is similar.
















Figure 7: U.S. calibration. Wealth quan-
tiles: .1, .25, .5, .75, .85, .95, conditional
on not having inherited.
















Figure 8: U.S. calibration. Wealth quan-
tiles: .1, .25, .5, .75, .85, .95, conditional
on having inherited.
Figures 7 and 8 show that in the simulations the wealth quantiles of the people who
do receive a bequest are signiﬁcantly higher than those who do not get a positive transfer of
wealth from their parent.
7. Discussion of the Assumptions
In order to make the model manageable and solvable, I have made several simplifying
assumptions. In this section I discuss the assumptions and their likely qualitative implica-
tions.
The assumption that children partially inherit their parents’ productivity is meant to
recover the fact that education and human capital are closely related to the family background
of each person. Becker and Tomes (1979), (1986) study the parents’ optimal investment
decision in children’s human capital in a setup in which human capital investment in children
has decreasing returns, while the return on physical capital is ﬁxed. In this setting parents
27begin investing in their children’s human capital and then invest in physical capital when
the return from human capital falls below the return on physical capital. In the presence
of borrowing constraints, the poorest families only invest in their children, and they may
not even be able to do so at the optimal level. The richest families not only invest in their
children’s human capital but also leave them physical capital. Poorer families will tend to
have poorer children, thus generating persistence in the lower end of the wealth distribution.
At the upper tail of the distribution, rich children might want to save less because they expect
large bequests. However, they will also be richer (because of their dominant income process
and the bigger transfers they receive from their parents); hence, they might want to save
more. At the aggregate level, this will increase or decrease persistence at the upper end of
the wealth distribution, depending on which eﬀect dominates. Most likely, if the altruism
toward their children is strong enough for the richer people, the desire to leave large estates
to children will oﬀset the reduction in saving because of the large bequests received. Which
eﬀect dominates thus depends on how wealth aﬀects savings at high levels of wealth.
As discussed previously, I made restrictive assumptions on the information available
to the children on their parent’s wealth and income. These assumptions are made for compu-
tational reasons but are also likely to aﬀect the results. In particular, I expect the model in
the current version to display fatter tails at both ends of the wealth distribution, compared
with a model in which the parent’s assets and income are observable by the child. With
perfect observability children of poor parents will save more, since they are aware that no
bequest will be left to them. In contrast, children of richer parents will save less. If wealth
of poor parents is easier to measure than wealth of rich parents, only the lower tail of the
distribution of wealth would become thinner.
Another important assumption is that there are no inter vivos transfers. In the data
these transfers often have a compensatory nature: parents tend to give when the children
need money the most. This may happen when they go to college, start a new job, get married,
buy a house, or get a sequence of bad shocks. This assumption is probably most relevant
when children are 20 to 35 years of age and are starting oﬀ on their own. Allowing for inter
vivos transfers would help reduce the number of people at zero wealth, especially among the
young.
28I take fertility to be exogenous and independent of households’ income. If poorer
families tend to have more children, the amount of resources received by each child will be
even lower, thus exacerbating wealth inequality. Knowles (1999) constructs a two-period,
overlapping-generations model with fertility choice, human capital investment, and voluntary
bequests, and he studies its implications on income and wealth inequality. The model is
capable of matching the fact that higher-income households on average tend to have fewer
children (with the possible exception, in the data, of the very richest families) and shows
that fertility decisions can help in matching some features of income concentration. While
this model does not generate the observed concentration of wealth in the upper tail of its
distribution, it would be interesting to investigate the eﬀect of diﬀerential fertility in a setup
similar to the one used in this paper.
I assume labor earnings to be exogenous. This is a limitation for two reasons. First,
labor supply might respond to the expectation of receiving a large bequest. Second, the
U.S. data show a noticeable correlation between high wealth and entrepreneurial activity.
Some households might accumulate huge fortunes because they face high implicit rates of
returns, but they are not free to borrow as much as they wish to exploit these investment
opportunities. Such a channel could be quantitatively important to fully account for the
saving decisions of the very richest. Both of these mechanisms are left for future research.
I also assume that the probability of death is independent of wealth and ability. In
the data the richer and more able people tend to live longer. Introducing heterogeneous
mortality (or survival probabilities that depend on wealth or ability) into the model would
not change the features of the saving behavior that are key in driving the results: poor people
save primarily for self-insurance; richer people also save to leave bequests. Given reasonable
assumptions on the life span, savings against life-span risk would remain a small fraction of
total wealth for the richest people. Therefore, introducing diﬀerential mortality in this model
(and, hence, a diﬀerent timing of bequests) would not have a signiﬁcant impact on wealth
inequality, and on the upper tail of the distribution in particular.
The results I report in the paper do not make any adjustment on consumption and
utility for the demographic changes the household is undergoing over time. Since Attanasio
et al. (1999) found demographics to be important in their setup, I also experimented by
29using per-adult-equivalent scale consumption, depending on the children’s age. (I used some
estimates kindly provided by Guglielmo Weber.) When I introduced this modiﬁcation, while
at the same time adjusting the discount factor to obtain a comparable capital-output ratio, the
results did not change in a quantitatively signiﬁcant way. The intuition is related to the key
features of saving behavior that I just described. Moreover, in this model, the hump-shaped
behavior in consumption and wealth is generated by the presence of borrowing constraints
(which generate the increasing part of the hump during youth) and age-dependent probability
of death (which generates the decreasing part of the hump after retirement).
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33Appendix A1. Transition Function
From the policy rules, the bequest distribution, and the exogenous Markov process for pro-
ductivity, we can derive a transition function ˜ M(x;·). The transition function ˜ M(x;·) is thus the
probability distribution of x  (the state in the next period), conditional on x, for a person who be-
haves according to the policy rules c(x)a n da(x).9 The measurable space over which ˜ M is deﬁned
is ( ˜ X, ˜ X), with









×B(Y ) ×B(Y ∪{ 0}),







˜ χ :˜ χ = X ∪ d,X ∈X,d∈{ ∅ ,{D}}
 
,
where P is the cardinal set of {1,...,T} and D indicates that a person is dead.
To characterize ˜ M, it is enough to display it for the sets
L(¯ t,¯ a, ¯ y, ¯ yp) ≡
 
(t ,a  ,y ,yp  ) ∈ X : t  ≤ ¯ t ∧ a  ≤ ¯ a ∧ y  ≤ ¯ y ∧ yp  ≤ ¯ yp
 
.
9For simplicity of notation I keep the dependence of ˜ M on c,a,µb implicit.
34On such sets ˜ M is deﬁned by ˜ M
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Iyp=0 + Iyp≤ ¯ ypαt+5
 
+i f x  = D
µb(x;[0,¯ a − a(x)])(1 − αt+5)Iyp>0
 
Qy(y,[0, ¯ y] ∩ Y )
0i f x = D
where I is an indicator function, which equals one if the subscript property is true and zero otherwise.
To understand ˜ M, notice that αt is the probability of surviving into the next period. Con-
ditional on survival, a person currently of age t will be of age t+1 next period; hence, the presence
of It+1≤¯ t. If the person’s parent is already dead, that is, yp = 0, the person cannot receive bequests
anymore, and his or her assets next period are a(x) for sure. (As discussed above, this is always
the relevant case for people 65 and older.) If, instead, the parent is still alive, that is, yp > 0, the
parent can survive into the next period with probability αt+5. In that case, tomorrow’s assets for
the person will be a(x)a n dyp  = yp. Alternatively, the parent may die, with probability 1 − αt+5.
Under this scenario, the person inherits next period, yp  = 0, and the probability that next period’s
assets are no more than ¯ a is the probability of receiving a bequest between 0 and ¯ a − a(x). The
person’s evolution of productivity is described by Qy. Note that the evolution of productivity, a
person’s survival, and the survival of the person’s parent are independent of each other. Finally,
death is an absorbing state.
Based on ˜ M, I can deﬁne an operator R ˜ M that maps probability distributions on ( ˜ X, ˜ X):
(R ˜ M ˜ m)(˜ χ) ≡
 
˜ M(x, ˜ χ)˜ m(dx),∀˜ χ ∈ ˜ X.
This operator describes the probability distribution of ﬁnding a person in state x  tomorrow, given
35the probability distribution of the state today. Such an operator has a unique ﬁxed point, which
is the probability distribution that attributes probability one to {D}: everybody dies eventually.
However, in the economy as a whole, I am not interested in keeping track of dead people, so I will
deﬁne a modiﬁed operator on measures on (X,X). Furthermore, I must take into account that new
people enter the economy in each period. The transition function corresponding to the modiﬁed
operator RM is thus
M(x,L(¯ t,¯ a, ¯ y, ¯ yp)) =
˜ M(x,L(¯ t,¯ a, ¯ y, ¯ yp)) + n5It=5Qyh(y,[0, ¯ y] ∩ Y )Iy≤ ¯ yp
n
.
The transition function M diﬀers from ˜ M in two ways. First, it accounts for population
growth; when population grows at rate n, a group that is 1% (say) of the population becomes
1/n% in the subsequent period. Second, it accounts for births, which explains the second term
in the numerator. If a person is 40 years old (t = 5), that person’s children (there are n5 of
them) will enter the economy next period. All of those children have age t = 1 and zero assets.10
Their stochastic productivity is inherited from their 40-year-old parent, according to the transition
function Qyh; y (which is part of x) is their parent’s productivity at 40.




The operator RM maps measures on (X,X) into measures on (X,X), but it does not necessar-
ily map probability measures into probability measures. Unless the population is at a demographic
steady state, the total measure of people alive may grow at a rate faster or slower than n, which
implies that (RMm)(x)  = 1 even if m(x)=1 .
10Since ¯ t ≥ 1 and ¯ a ≥ 0, I do not need to include I1≤¯ t and I0≤¯ t.
36Appendix A2. Consistency of Bequest Distributions
First deﬁne the marginal distribution of age and productivity in the population, which is a
probability distribution on
({1,...,T}×Y,P({1,...,T}) ×B(Y )) :
m∗
t,y(χt,y) ≡ m∗({x ∈ X :( t,y) ∈ χt,y}) ∀χt,y ∈P({1,...,T}) ×B(Y ).
Deﬁne m∗(·|t,y) as the conditional distribution of x given t and y. For any given (t,y),
m∗(·|t,y) is a probability distribution11 on (X,X). For any set χ ∈X , m∗(χ|t,y) is measurable




t,y(dt,dy)=m∗(χ) ∀χ ∈X ∀ χt,y ∈P({1,...,T}) ×B(Y ).
The child observes the parent’s productivity at age 40. The conditional distribution of the
characteristics of the parent at age 40, given a productivity level yp,i s 12 m∗(·|t =5 ,y= yp). I want
the characteristics of the parent at later ages, conditional on the parent’s productivity as of age 40
being yp and conditional on not having died. Denote by l(·|t,yp) these conditional distributions.
They can be obtained recursively as follows: l(χ|5,y p)=m∗(χ|5,yp)a n d






The conditional distributions l(·|t,yp) imply conditional distributions of assets la(·|t,yp)o n
11The conditional distribution {m∗(χ|t,y)} is uniquely deﬁned up to sets of m∗
t,y-measure zero.
12Iu s eyp to distinguish from both y and yp: yp plays the role of productivity for the parent (state variable
y) and the parent’s productivity for the child (state variable yp).
37( +,B( +)), which are given by
la(χa|t,yP) ≡ l({x ∈ X : a ∈ χa}|t,yp).
Since the probability of death is independent of productivity and assets, the distribution of
assets that are bequeathed by dying parents is the same as the distribution of assets of surviving

















∈ χa|t +5 ,yp
 
∀χa ∈B ( +) ∀a ∈  + ∀y,yp ∈ Y, t =1 ,...,T − 5.
In equation (A1), I take into account the assumptions made before about the structure
of bequest taxation and the assumption that the bequest is distributed evenly among surviving
children.
I now need to deﬁne µb when t = T −4, which is the last age at which a person can inherit.
Since there are no survivors at age T + 1, I cannot use the survivor’s assets to compute the assets
that are bequeathed. Instead, I use the policy function a(x)t od e ﬁ n e
la(χa|T +1 ,yp) ≡
 
X
Ia(x)∈χal(dx|T,yp) ∀χa ∈B ( +).
With this deﬁnition, equation (A1) can be extended to t = T −4 as well. Equation (A1) is thus the
formal requirement of consistency on µb.
38Appendix A3. More on the Calibration
Survival probabilities: In the calibration of the U.S. economy, I use the mortality probabilities
of people born in 1965 (which are for the most part projected, since these people are still young)
provided by Bell, Wade, and Goss (1992). The Statistical Yearbook of Sweden (1997) provides the
mortality probabilities for people at various ages in 1991–95. Since life expectancy is increasing, the
Swedish data underestimate the life expectancy at the various ages with respect to the one faced
by people born in 1965 in Sweden. To correct for this problem, I use the U.S. data to compute the
relative increase in life expectancy for the relevant period. I then correct the Swedish data assuming
that the increase in life expectancy is the same in the two countries. However, as a check, I also us
the U.S. conditional probabilities in the simulation of the Swedish economy. It turns out that this
has a negligible impact on the results even if the life expectancy of Swedish people is about three
years longer than that of U.S. people.
Age-eﬃciency proﬁle vector  t: I assume it to be the same in both countries. Its source is
Hansen (1993).
The rates of population growth, n, are set to the respective average population growth from
1950 to 1997 for each country (Economic Report of the President (1998), and OECD Economic
Surveys, 1998-1999: Sweden (1999)).
The ratio of g (total government expenditure and gross investment, excluding transfers - which
includes federal, state and local for the U.S.) to GDP comes from the Economic Report of the
President (1998) and OECD Economic Surveys, 1998-1999: Sweden (1999) for 1996.
The capital income tax τa (computed by Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser (1999) for the United
States) is equal to a ﬂat tax rate of 30% in Sweden (Statistics Sweden, Web site:
http://www.scb.se/indexeng.asp).
Estimates for the log income process using PSID income data aggregated over ﬁve years are very
39kindly provided by Joe Altonji and Ernesto Villanueva. The regressions were run as follows.
Speciﬁcation
Left-hand side variable 1 2 3 4
Husband’s earnings persistence 0.92 0.91 .87 0.86
variance 0.41 0.41 0.31 0.30
Husband’s earnings persistence 0.90 0.89 0.84 0.81
plus wife’s earnings variance 0.38 0.36 0.29 0.27
Husband’s earnings persistence 0.94 0.94 0.88 0.87
plus unempl. insurance variance 0.41 0.38 0.32 0.31
plus workmen’s compensation
Husband’s earnings persistence 0.92 0.90 0.85 0.80
plus wife’s earnings variance 0.38 0.36 0.30 0.27
plus unempl. insurance
plus workmen’s compensation
Table 7: Log earnings persistence and variance.
Speciﬁcation 1: Regressors are year dummies (take value 1 if the year is the ﬁrst of a period of ﬁve)
and a fourth order polynomial in age, in diﬀerences from 40.
Speciﬁcation 2: Same regressors as in (1), plus an extra intercept for nonwhite.
Speciﬁcation 3: Same regressors as in (2), plus dummies for less than 5 years of schooling, more than
5 and less than 8, more than 8 and less than 11, college dropout, college, and more than college.
Speciﬁcation 4: Same regressors as in (3), plus intercept for not married, whether there are children
in the household, and the number of children.
The estimates for persistence and variance in the upper half of the table are based on the
sample of male heads of household in the PSID for the period 1968–97. The PSID was divided in
equally spaced 5-year periods, and income was aggregated within those cells. Only complete income
spells of ﬁve years were used staring in 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, and 1993.
The estimates in the lower half of the table are based on a sample of males in the PSID
40for the period 1978–97, given that questions about the exact amount of unemployment insurance
and workmen’s compensation are only available from 1977 on. Income from both unemployment
insurance and workmen’s compensation are asked of husband and wife.
In all speciﬁcations, observations with earnings below ﬁve times 900 dollars (from 1993)
are dropped. The variance is taken from the pooled cross-section and time series variation of the
prediction errors in the corresponding regression.
In my calibration for the United States, I choose the persistence and variance parameters
from the regression that includes log earnings of the husband, earnings of the wife, and transfers
and that pertain to the third speciﬁcation, the one that accounts for age, race, and some education
eﬀects. This is a middle-of-the-range estimate among the relevant ones. It should be noted, however,
that the range of the estimated parameters from the various regressions is rather tight.
I convert both the productivity and the productivity inheritance processes to four-state dis-
crete Markov chains according to Tauchen and Hussey (1991). Since I want the possible realizations
for the initial inherited productivity level to be the same as the possible realizations for productiv-
ity during the lifetime, I choose the quadrature points jointly for the two processes. The resulting
gridpoints for the productivity process y for the United States and for Sweden are, respectively:
[0.2594, 0.6513, 1.5355, 3.8547] and [0.3941, 0.7438, 1.3444, 2.5373]. Given the assump-
tions on the parameters of the processes, the transition matrices Qy and Qyh for the United States
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0.7132 0.2764 0.0104 0.0000
0.1467 0.6268 0.2210 0.0055
0.0055 0.2210 0.6268 0.1467












0.5257 0.4228 0.0509 0.0007
0.1461 0.5538 0.2825 0.0176
0.0176 0.2825 0.5538 0.1461
0.0007 0.0509 0.4228 0.5257
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Table 8 reports data on earnings distributions for the United States and Sweden, respectively,
and compares them with the earnings distributions used in the model. The tables are computed
using data for households whose head is 25 to 60 years of age. For each country the ﬁrst row refers
to gross earnings (which include wages, salaries, and self-employment income); the second row adds
social insurance transfers to gross earnings; while the third row reports the earnings distribution
implied by the model.
Percentage earnings in the top
Gini
coeﬀ. 5% 10% 20% 40% 60% 80%
U.S. earnings data
. 4 61 9 3 04 87 28 9 9 8
U.S. earnings + social insurance transfers
. 4 41 9 3 04 77 18 8 9 7
U.S. simulated earnings
. 4 41 5 3 05 07 38 7 9 6
Swedish earnings data
. 4 01 5 2 54 26 88 6 9 8
Swedish earnings + social insurance transfers
. 3 31 3 2 23 76 28 0 9 4
Swedish simulated earnings
. 3 31 2 2 44 06 58 1 9 3
Table 8: Earnings.
Estate taxes: According to U.S. law, each individual can make an unlimited number of tax-free
gifts of $10,000 or less per year, per recipient; therefore, a married couple can transfer $20,000 per
year to each child, or other beneﬁciary. For larger gifts and estates, there is a uniﬁed credit, that is,
42a credit received by the estate of each deceased, against lifetime estate and gift taxes. For the period
between 1987 and 1997, each taxpayer received a tax credit that eliminated estate tax liabilities on
estates valued at less than $600,000. The marginal tax rate applicable to estates and lifetime gifts
above that threshold is progressive, starting from 37% (Poterba (1998)). However, the revenue from
estate taxes is very low (on the order of .2% of GDP in 1985–97) because there are many eﬀective
ways to avoid such taxes. (See, e.g., Aaron and Munnell (1992).) Moreover, only about 1.5% of
decedents pay estate taxes. Therefore, in the model I set exb to be 40 times the median income and
τb to be 10% to match the observed ratio of estate tax revenues to GDP and the proportion of estates
that pay estate taxes. I discuss the sensitivity of the model to the choice of these two parameters
when describing the results. For Sweden, I take the eﬀective tax rate to be higher than that for
the United States, 15%, and the exemption level to be lower, 10 years of average labor earnings. In
Sweden taxes are paid on inheritances, rather than on estates, and the revenue from inheritance and
gift taxes is approximately .1% of GDP. The statutory tax rate for children’s inheritance is higher
than in the United States (for the ﬁrst bracket it is about 50%) and the exemption level is much
lower (on the order of $5,000), but there are legal ways, for example, bequeathing an apartment or
a large ﬁrm, of obtaining a much larger exemption level. It is therefore more diﬃcult than in the
United States to deﬁne the statutory exemption level. The combined choice of τb and exb matches
the revenues from bequests and gift taxes.
43